Editorial by Kuhn, Harold B.
Faith and Reason: A Perennial Problem
The intensity with which the ques
tion of the relation of faith to reason
is being considered today has scarcely
a parallel in history. It is small won
der that the layman is beginning to ask
whether man's pro'j;ress at this point
must always be l*enelope-like, each
generation unraveling what the form
er had done, and beginning over. Nor
is it reassuring to him to learn that
little agreement has been reached con
cerning even the meanings of the bas
ic terms employed in the investigation.
But since the question is still an open
one, there is no reason to apologize
for one more editorial dealing with
it.
The Faith-Reason problem is, bas
ically, the modern form of the ancient
conflict between religion and philoso
phy. Plato saw the conflict as between
the poet*^ (especially Homer and Hesi-
od, who were the spokesmen for tra
ditional Greek theology) and the phil
osophers. The conflict, however, be
comes more acute when theology has
come to connote, not the heroic poetry
of a people, but a body of authoritative
religious teaching, claiming to grow
out of a concrete historical setting,
and proposing to challenge many of
the accepted conclusions, not only of
philosophy but also of experimental
science.
It is difficult to avoid the observa
tion, that some contemporary thinkers
have been extreme in their assertions
that the current modes of scientific
understanding of man and his world
are to be equated with the necessary
and final conclusions of reason, and
as such can be viewed onlj* as antitheti
cal to faith. This assumes a finality
to scientific assumptions which is dif
ficult to square with the usual defini
tion of 'reason'. This definition is two
fold : reason is both the capacity to dis
cover truth by thinking, and the abili
ty to relate this truth to concrete ac
tion. As such, it is scarcely to be link
ed finally with any scientific approach
to reality, since science has its fads
and makes its false starts.
This raises the more important
question, is there any semper, ubique,
ci ah oiiniihus of reason? The stereo
type of the eighteenth century ration
alist is held to have thought so. More
recently positivism has denied that
such a Reason ever existed or will ex
ist. All we can expect, it asserts, is a
substitution of the term 'warrantably
assertible' for 'truth' and a constant
modification of conclusions in the light
of further scientific inquiry. Some will
inquire whether this is not a rather
naive reliance upon the techniques of
science. But however we may think of
this, it seems clear that the classic
rationalist assumption, that the con
clusions of reason, once achieved, are
of perennial and unchanging value,
can no longer go unchallenged.
How, then, are we to think of rea
son? If it is not an instrument for
discovering a complete system of per
ennial and final truth through its ex-
jjloration of its own logical harmony,
and if on the other hand it is naive to
equate it with scientific inquiry, then
what can be said for it? Possibly the
answer is to be found through the ob
servation that both of these solutions
are too simple.
Several contemporary movements
have come to our aid at this point.
While it is impossible for most of us
to give a blanket vote of confidence to
the newer psychology, we must ac
knowledge gratefully the challenge to
simple rationalism which has come
from its assertion that the human ego
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is subject to both challenge and de
ception by the processes which lie be
low the level of recognized conscious
ness. In the light of this, it is difficult
to assert without explanation the sov
ereignty of reason, even though we
assert against Freud, that morality
(and hence responsibility) can be
found at every level of mind. Any
hypnotist will tell us that, whether
the mind be rightly divided into con
scious and unconscious and/or sub
conscious, or whether it exists in vary
ing degrees of consciousness, morality
is present along the entire mental
scale. In any case, reason can scarcely
be credited with the achievements and
possibilities with which eighteenth-
century thought was inclined to invest
her.
The second blow which contempor
ary thought has dealt to the classical
view of reason is that which comes
from the dialectical movement. This
asserts that the antinomies wliich oc
cur in thought when we begin to think
eodstentially arise from the basically
dialectical character of our elementa-
ly principles of thought. This in turn
can be interpreted in one of two ways :
possibly it grows out of the antinomy
which appears Avhen the finite faces
the Infinite; or possibly it goes more
deeply still, to the nature of reality. In
other words, possibly Przywara is cor
rect in interpreting the whole of reali
ty in terms of essential polarity.
In any case, rational thought is dia
lectical in character. This being true,
even philosophizing is far from being
the simple affair that some have
thought. It was Kant Avho called the
attention of modern philosophy to this
fact�a fact of which Plato was well
aware, and which he set forth in the
Parmenides. The meaning of this for
our present discussion is, that reason
must, in the light of more recent in
sights, accept a humbler and more dis
ciplined place than her adherents have
claimed for her in her feud with faith.
It is evident, of course, that assert
ing the limitations of reason as an in
strument for achieving truth is one
thing; and offering a solution to the
problem of reason and faith is quite
another. At this point, however, both
common fairness and clarity demand
that some attention be given to the
current understanding of what is
meant by 'faith'. At one extreme
stands the vicAV held by Auguste Com-
te. His three stages of human culture
may be illustrated as folows : the peri
od of faith was that age of humanity
in which simple creatures traced their
steps in the snow of theology. The age
of metaphysics was that which skated
somewhat unimaginatively upon the
hard bits of ice which remained when
most of the snow had melted. The age
of positivism (extending until the pres
ent) is the age of critical labors in
the sunshine which has evaporated
both the snow of theology and the ice
crust of metaphysics.
^[odern empiricism is not far differ
ent from earlier positivism in its view
of faith, which amounts to a confi
dence in the techniques and conclu
sions of ex])erimental science. This
given, the area of knowledge is con
fined to those subjects or conclusions
whicli are referable to the five senses
for verification. Empiricists of this
thorough-going character are frank in
insisting that all we know of man and
his world contradicts the teachings of
traditional religion in general, and his
toric Christianity in particular. At
best, faith is an escape from life's hard
necessities, essential perhaps to the un
learned, but valuable only as it satis
fies certain emotional needs�needs
which will evaporate with the increas
ed spread of scientific knowledge.
At the opposite extreme stands
an uncritical fundamentalism, which
makes sweeping assertions concerning
matters of which it knows little or
nothing. Without even taking the
pains which thinkers of the Middle
Ages exercised to develop their view
of a fluplex Veritas, uncritical funda-
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mentalism assumes as ffiven that religi
ous truth, interpreted in its own facile
manner, is completely and easily recon
cilable with truth in all other areas of �
human life and knowledge. This mini
mizes the entire problem of struggle
which is involved in the matter of in
terpretation of the Bible. Rejecting the
latitudinarian view which theological
liberals have taken of Paul's famous
metaphor: "For the letter killeth, but
the spirit giveth life," (II Corinthians
3:6) uncritical fundamentalism seeks
to solve the problems which arise in
interpretation at the level of the letter,
this being frequently attempted with
out even taking recourse to the Scrip
ture in the languages in which it was
originally written.
Between these two extremes stands
the Crisis Theology, with its prior di
vision of the field of knowledge into
two areas, and its subsequent asser
tion of the non-rational character of
religious truth. It is probable that
most of us reared in the Anglo-Ameri
can intellectual tradition can scarcely
bring to the dialectical approach a
proper sympathy of mind. Perhaps if
we in America possessed something
parallel to the NihehmgenliefL and had
learned from our earliest years to en
ter sympathetically into the spirit of
some such national epic, we could then
comprehend better the idea of super-
existence (Urfjcschichtr) . As things
stand, we tend to view surh concepts
as impossible-becausp-illogical ; our ex
aggerated practicality prevents us from
understanding what Barth and Brun-
ner are trying to say.
This writer is not suggesting that
the dialectical theologians have the
right answer to the problem of Faith-
Reason. Hs is simply acknowledging
that some of the language-forms in
which these men couch their views are
such that most of us do not properly
understand them. What contribution,
then, can we expect to find in their
system (and the crisis theology seems
to be hardening into a semblance of
a system) which will correct our ex
tremes, and which may point the way
to a solution?
But some reader will object, that we
have prejudiced this newer theology,
and have given no good reasons for
doing so. The chief objection to the
dialectical theology seems to be, that
it has carried its principle of dialectic
too far. It is one thing to say that the
nature of mind (and perhaps also the
nature of reality) demands a move
ment of alternation in the reasoning
process. It is quite another to say
that the entire world of thought is a
house radically divided. Again, it is
one thing to assert that the knowledge
upon which faith rests is something
less than absolutely certain (from the
point of view of pure intellect), and
that faith is the link between such
knowledge and religious certainty. It
is quite another thing to assert that
faith accepts as true that which is ra
tionally absurd. That which is deeper
than human consciousness is not nec
essarily irrational.
More specifically, it seems that the
approach to the Bible which the dia
lectical theologians make is no more
adequate than that taken by uncritical
fundamentalists. The former overload
the r61e of 'spirit' in interpretation,
and fail to do justice to the historical
matrix in which the Scriptures are set.
The latter place an uncritical (and
therefore exaggerated) emphasis upon
the 'letter' and become wooden in their
approach. Neither seem able to make
the necessary allowance for a spirit of
tentativeness which is essential to the
solution of a problem which has so
many places of openness, and so many
points at which tension is inevitable.
In short, the Faith-Reason contro
versy is too complex for any easy solu
tion. So long as the God of faith trans
cends the sphere of any determinate
being, the mind of man can only ap
proximate a knowledge of Him. Even
a Revelation of Him will at some
points be, necessarily, set in terms
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which will be above our powers of
thought. But this is quite different
from asserting that such a Revelation
is basically irrational.
Both the dialectical theology and
uncritical fundamentalism seem to be
outgrowths of moods of impatience.
Such moods are understandable, par
ticularly in times like these. Both
movements have something to say;
either seems preferable to the solution
offered by scientific humanism. Fun
damentalism is strong in its contention
that the truth of Revelation is insep
arable from the accuracy of the his
torical setting out of which the Bible
came. It deserves to be heard as well
for its insistence upon the possibility
of a literal supernatural invasion of
the natural order by the Creative
Cause.
The dialectical theology has, on the
other hand, made a valuable contribu
tion to the exploration of the problem
in hand, in its assertion that not all
will be easy going in the understand
ing of the ways of the Infinite. At the
same time, it appears weak in its in
ability to distinguish between what is
factual, and what is the cipher in God's
self-expression to men. The problem
of religious knowledge, especially in its
relation to the question of the objec
tive truth of Christianity, cannot be
solved apart from some more adequate
comprehension of this question. And
we venture that if and when such a
solution is achieved, it will be found
to leave us a Bible which is much more
acceptable as historically accurate than
most modems now believe.
�H. B. El.
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